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I. General remarks
1. In Joint Declaration No 3, annexed to the
Convention on the mutual recognition of companies
and legal persons, signed at Brussels on 29 February
1968, the Governments of the Member States of the
European Communities expressed their willingness to
study means of avoiding differences in the interpretation
of the Convention. To this end, they agreed to examine
the possibility of conferring jurisdiction in certain
matters on the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and if necessary, to negotiate an
agreement to that effect. 
similar Joint Declaration was annexed to the
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at
Brussels on 27 September 1968. This Declaration
envisages the possibility of assigning to the Court 
Justice jurisdiction both to interpret the Convention and to settle any conflicting claims and disclaimers of
jurisdiction which may arise in applying it.
2. In the course of negotiations to give effect to these
Declarations, it was soon agreed to give the Court
additional jurisdiction, and to use for the purpose a
system based on Article 177 of the treaty. The further
question nevertheless arose as to whether it would be
appropriate to draft a general convention applicable to
all the conventions which had been or were to be
concluded on the basis of Article 220, or whether 
would not be preferable to seek solutions which took
into account the individual characteristics of each of
these conventions.
This question was approached in an entirely pragmatic
manner. A detailed study was made of the two Conven-
tions already signed, the Convention on the mutual
recognition of companies and legal persons, and the
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters.
3. This study led to the conclusion that these two
Conventions have distinct features which justify
different arrangements for their interpretation by the
Court of Justice. Although it had been suggested that a
single convention might determine the jurisdiction of
the Court to interpret all the conventions concluded on
the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty, in the end it w
thought preferable to conclude separate Protocols which
would be better adapted to the requirements of each of
the Conventions.
4. There was no need to apply the procedure of Article
236 of the Treaty for the purposes of concluding these
Protocols since they deal with the interpretation of
Conventions drawn up pursuant to Article 220 of the
Treaty and in no way aim at revising the Treaty itself.
They merely confer on the Court of Justice further
jurisdiction which is additional to, but does not affect
its existing jurisdiction (1
II. Protocol on the interpretation of the Convention on
the mutual recognition of companies and legal persons
5. As regards the interpretation of the Convention on
the mutual recognition of companies and legal persons
(l) On various occasions, jurisdiction has been conferred on
the Court of Justice without reference to the revision
procedure set out in Article 236 (internal agreements under
Conventions of Association  see OJ No 93, 11. 6. 1964
p. 1490/64; provisions of Council Regulation No 17 on
appeal to the Court  see OJ No 13 , 21. 2. 1962
p. 204/62).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/67
there was thought to be no reason for departing from
the preliminary ruling system laid down in Article 177
of the Treaty; and this system was therefore adopted in
the draft Protocol in question.
Article 1 of the Protocol confers on the Court
jurisdiction to interpret the Convention of 29 February
1968, Joint Declaration No 1 contained in the Protocol
annexed to that Convention, and the Protocol which is
the subject of this report. Article 2 repeats, in identical
terms, the second and third paragraphs of Article 177
defining the circumstances in which references may be
made to the Court by courts which have to decide
questions of interpretation.
6. Since the Convention sometimes refers back to
national law, the problem arose as to whether it might
be necessary expressly to exclude the jurisdiction of the
Court to interpret such law. It was thought unnecessary
expressly to exclude jurisdiction in this respect, for the
cases decided by the Court of Justice have already
firmly established that it has no jurisdiction to interpret
national law.
7. Article 3 concerns the procedure to be followed
before the Court of Justice when, in accordance with
the Protocol, the Court is asked to give a ruling.
It was thought appropriate to provide that the Rules of
Procedure of the Court should be supplemented to take
account of the new jurisdiction. Article 3 (2) indicated
that Article 188 of the Treaty is to be used for this
purpose.
It was considered that, in order to ensure that the
Convention would be applied as effectively and 
uniformly as possible, an exchange of information
should be organized on judgments of national courts
against whose decision there is no remedy under
national law.
A Joint Declaration to this effect is annexed to the
Protocol.
III. Protocol on the interpretation of the Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters
8. The study of the Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters showed that it has features sufficiently
distinctive to justify a separate system for its
interpretation by the Court of Justice.
There was unanimous agreement on the need to ensure
uniform interpretation of the Convention, and hence to
confer new jurisdiction on the Court of Justice, using a
system based on Article 177. But it was feared that, in
view of the number and diversity of the disI1utes to
which the Convention applies, an applic~ition for a
preliminary ruling on the lines of Article 177 might be
made by one of the parties either as a delaying tactic or
as a means of putting pressure on an opponent of
modest financial means. In short, the application might
be made for improper purposes.
(1) This Convention will be applicable in a large
number of cases. It governs not only recognition
and enforcement of judgments, but also the
international jurisdiction of the courts, and 
particular all cases where a person is sued in the
courts of a Contracting State in which he is not
domiciled. Moreover, it is not confined to a limited
field such as the recognition of companies, but
extends to all civil and commercial matters relating
to rights in property (litigation over all kinds of
contract non-contractual liability, maintenance
etc.
(2) At the stage of recognition and enforcement, Article
34 of the Convention provides that the court to
which application is made for the issue of an order
for enforcement shall give its decision without
delay, and without the party against whom
enforcement is sought being entitled at that stage of
the proceedings to make any submissions.
Plainly, an application to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling would, if made at this stage,
undermine the object of the Convention which, by
introducing a new, standardized ex parte  procedure
for enforcement, aims at eliminating delaying tactics
and preventing the respondent from withdrawing
his assets from any measure of enforcement.
(3) Finally it must be stressed that decisions of the
Court of Justice on the interpretation of the
Convention differ from decisions on . the
interpretation of other conventions, as regards the
consequences for the parties.
Thus, if the court were to interpret a provision of
the Convention so as to rule that the courts seised of
a matter had no jurisdiction, the proceedings might
well have to be instituted again from the outset
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originally seised or, perhaps, in other courts in the
same State (see, for example, Article 5 of the
Convention which lays down special rules of
jurisdiction) .
9. The Protocol therefore follows the system of Article
177, but subject to such adjustments as were thought
necessary to deal with the matters set out above. The
system may be summarized as follows:
(a) the courts which are allowed to refer questions to
the court are expressly specified;
(b) the right to apply to the court for a preliminary
ruling is not given to courts of first instance;
(c) the Protocol provides that the Courts of Cassation
and other courts of last instance are required to refer
a question of interpretation to the court if they
consider that a decision of the Court on that
question is necessary to enable them to gIve
judgment;
(d) in addition to requests for a preliminary ruling,
there is a novel provision for interpretation by the
Court of Justice, similar to the 'pourvoi dans
l'interet de la loi'
10. Article 1, which is similar to Article 1 o( the
Protocol on the interpretation of the Convention on the
mutual recognition of companies and legal persons
confers on the Court jurisdiction to interpret the
Convention of 27 September 1968 and its Protocol, as
well as the Protocol which is the subject of this report.
11. Article 2 lists the national courts which may ask
the Court to give a preliminary ruling.
(1) Courts of first instance are not included in this list.
Their exclusion is designed mainly to prevent the
interpretation of the Court being requested in too
many cases, and particularly in trivial matters.
Moreover, it was thought that where two courts of
first instance, for example a 'justice de paix' and an
Amtsgericht, gave judgments which became  res
judicata  and showed differences of interpretation in
the application of the Convention, this should not
necessitate further action, any more than would
similar differences of interpretation between two
inferior courts of the same country. Similarly, it was
argued that the Court of Justice should not 
required to give rulings unless it was fully informed.
In order to achieve this, questions of interpretation
should, in the first place, be dealt with by the
national courts, especially in view of the fact that in
the interests of legal certainty the Court of Justice
can only seldom depart from the principles
established by its previous judgments.
(2) Article 2 (1) specifies by name the courts which are
allowed to refer questions to the Court of Justice
including those which, pursuant to Article 3 (1), are
required to do so. Such a list seemed to be essential
since the present wording of the third paragraph of
Article 177 has given rise to conflicting
interpretations as to which are the courts and
tribunals against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law (for example
the theoretical and pragmatic schools of thought in
Germany).
It seemed all the more necessary to make this point
clear because, under the Protocol, inferior courts
have no jurisdiction to refer a question to the Court
of Justice.
This list also takes -into account the fact that the
Convention of 27 September 1968 governs only
civil and commercial matters concerning property
rights; the list therefore includes only those Courts
which have jurisdiction in such cases.
(3) Article 2 (2) states that the power to refer a
question to the Court is also given to the courts of
the Contracting States when they are sitting in an
appellate capacity. The Courts in question thus
include courts of appeal, save for the exceptional
cases when they are sitting at first instance when
sitting in an appellate capacity.
In the Federal Republic of Germany the expression
appeal' includes 'Beschwerde
(4) Article 2 (3) lays down that in the cases provided
for in Article 37 of the Convention of 27 September
1968, the courts referred to in that Article may also
refer a question to the Court of Justice. It will be
remembered that Article 37 governs appeals against
judgments authorizing the enforcement of a foreign
judgment.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/69
12. Article 3 lays down that a court of last instance 
bound to refer a question to the Court of Justice only '
it considers that a decision on the question is necessary
to enable it to enable it to give judgment . In Article 177
of the Treaty of Rome this provision appears only in the
second paragraph, governing cases in which other
courts are entitled to refer a question to the Court of
Justice.
The provision contained in Article 3 (1) of the Protocol
accords with the interpretation now generally given to
Article 177: it is generally agreed to be beyond dispute
that a court of last instance has discretion to assess the
relevance of questions put to it for interpretation.
Nevertheless, this provision seemed necessary to avoid
conflicting interpretations; for it will be remembered
that, as has already been pointed out in paragraph 8 (3)
of this report, decisions of the Court of Justice on the
interpretation of the Judgments Convention differ, in
their consequences, from decisions of the interpretation
of other conventions. 
Thus if the jurisdiction of a court were challenged on
appeal, and the Court of Justice ruled that the
Convention had been misinterpreted by the first court
the proceedings might have to be instituted again from
the very beginning, either in another State or, perhaps
in another court in the same State.
party to an action might accordingly be greatly
tempted to raise a question of interpretation of the
Convention before an appellate court merefy in order to
gain time, and the temptation would be all the greater if
that court were automatically required to refer the
question to the Court of Justice.
A number of other solutions were considered, including
giving the highest courts only a power, rather than a
duty, to refer a question to the Court, or requiring them
to refer a question only if they would otherwise give to
provision an interpretation different from the
interpretation alreaay given either by the Court of
Justice or by other courts. Finally, however, a provision
very close to Article 177 was adopted in order to
achieve the greatest possible uniformity in Community
law.
For the reasons set out above, it was thought necessary
to confirm the discretion of courts of last instance by
means of a clear and unambiguous text, and above all
to make it proof against any possible subsequent
tendency automatically to refer questions to the Court.
As regards its fonD, Article 3 differs from Article 177, in
that it sets out first of all the rule for the courts of last
instance, and thereafter for the other courts. The object
of this modified form was to emphasize that the Pro-
tocol was designed solely to provide a specific solution
to problems of interpretation of the Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters.
13. Since the Convention also refers back to national
law, reference should be made to what was said in this
connection in the commentary on the protocol on the
interpretation of the Convention on the mutual
recognition of companies (see paragraph 6).
14. Article 4 lays down a new procedure based in part
on the 'pourvoi dans l'interet de la loi' and in part on
the procedure for giving advisory opinions. All the
countries of the Community, with the exception of the
Federal Republic of Germany, have a form of appeal for
the clarification of a point of law which enables the
competent judicial authority, in this instance the
Procurators-General of the Courts of Cassation, to
appeal against a final decision which misunderstands or
misapplies either the letter or the spirit of the law. The
purpose of this appeal is to avoid perpetuating 
erroneous interpretation of the law where the parties
have omitted to appeal against the decision which
includes that interpretation (see Dalloz, Encyclopedie
juridique under Cassation No 2509).
Article 4 is designed to make for  uniform
interpretation of the Convention by introducing a
procedure complementary to the request for a
preliminary ruling provided for in Article 3. The
purpose is to ensure a uniform interpretation for the
future wherever existing judgments are in conflict.
In the last analysis this procedure occupies an
intermediate position between the 'pourvoi dans
interet de la loi', from which it differs in that it does
not entail the setting aside of a judgment which is
ultimately shown to ' have  misinterpreted the
Convention, and that of an advisory appeal. The
procedure is, however, limited to cases in which a court
has already given judgment.
Paragraph 1 defines the cases in which the competent
authority of a State may apply to the Court of Justice. It
will be for that authority to decide whether it is
advisable to refer a matter to the Court, and it will
presumably not do so unless the national judgment
includes reasons which might lead to an interpretation
different from that previously given by the Court 
Justice or by a foreign court. If there are no factors
involved which make it likely that the principlesNo C 59/70 Official Journal of the European Communities
established in the decided cases would be changed, the
national authority could always seek to clarify the point
of law by appealing in its own country in accordance
with the procedure there in force.
Paragraph 2 lays down that rulings given by the Court
shall not affect the decisions submitted to it, in the same
way that the setting aside of a judgment following an
appeal to clarify a point of law in no way influences the
position of the parties.
It follows that the judgments of the Court cannot give
rise to any fresh proceedings, even where otherwise an
extraordinary avenue of appeal might be appropriate.
Paragraph 3 lays down that the Procurators-General of
the Courts of Cassation (who, in the countries which
know the 'pourvoi dans l'interet de la loi' , are
competent) or any other authority designated by a State
are entitled to request the Court of Justice for a ruling.
The designation of the Procurators-General is further
evidence that the appeal procedure laid down in Article
4 is intended solely to clarify points of law.
The wording of paragraph 3 takes a~count of the
situation obtaining in Germany, where the 'pourvoi
dans l'interet de la loi' is unknown. It furthermore
empowers any of the Contracting States to designate any
other authority or even to designate two authorities, as
for example the Procurator-General for appeals against
judgments of civil, commercial or criminal courts in
civil matters, and the Minister of Justice for appeals
against decisions of administrative tribunals.
Paragraph 4 amends Article 20 of the Statute of the
Court of Justice to deal with the procedure provided for
in Article 4. The amendment takes account of the fact
that the parties to the original proceedings will have no
interest in intervening at this stage.
It may be wondered what are the implications of a
ruling on interpretation given on the basis of Article 4.
The ruling certainly is not binding on the parties. It
must be acknowledged that such a ruling has no force in
law, and that accordingly nobody is bound by it. But
clearly it will have the greatest persuasive authority and
will for the future constitute the guideline for all
Community courts. In this respect it may be compared
with the decision on a 'pourvoi dans l'interet de la loi'
Such a decision is binding on nobody, but constitutes a
decision of principle of the greatest importance for the
future, and one which judges will generally follow.
15. Article 5 of the Protocol, like Article 3 of the
Protocol on the interpretation of the Convention on the
mutual recognition of companies extends the
provIsIOns governing the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice to cover the exercise of the new jurisdiction conferred on it. 
However, these provisions are extended only in so far as
the Protocol does not otherwise provide; this
reservation chiefly concerns Article 177 of the Treaty,
whose provisions, even if they should be modified, are
not. applicable to the Protocol, which has its own
separate provisions on this point.
16. Article 11 provides for any relevant amendment to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States.
17. The other Articles of the Protocol, which contain
the final provisions, give rise to no particular comment.
Again, an exchange of information is to be organized on
the decisions of the courts referred to in Article 2 (1) in
order to ensure that the Convention is applied as
effectively and as uniformly as possible. A Joint
Declaration to this effect is annexed to the Protocol.
18. The provisions of the Convention on  lis pendens
and related actions should go a long way, if not all the
way, towards resolving any problems which may arise
from conflicting claims and disclaimers of jurisdiction.
Where, however, such problems arise from conflicting
interpretations, they will be solved by applying the
Protocol.